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Consequences of Fraud and Overcoming Negative Market Reaction 
 
This paper investigates firms that have attracted scrutiny from the SEC and that have been found 
to be involved in fraud. We examine the market reaction for the sample of firms following the 
announcement of their involvement in fraud, which we refer to as trigger event. We match our 
sample of firms with others by industry, size, market-to-book and Altman Z-Score to compare our 
sample of firms with others that have not been involved in fraud at the time of trigger event. We 
find that the fraud sample attract negative and significant returns following the announcement of 
fraud, in contrast to the control sample. We also examine tactics that firms may use to regain the 
market’s confidence, such as changes in executives, auditing firm and company name. We find 
that the market reacts negatively right after the change in executives, but the negative trend is 
reversed in the long-term for the firms that make the executive change quickly after the trigger 
event. Similarly, firms that change their auditing firm quickly are better off. We also find that 
there is significantly higher information asymmetry during the trigger event, litigation date, as 
well as changes in CEO, CFO and auditor. We also use accrual models to identify earnings 
management and find that the non-discretionary accruals Jones and Modified Jones models show a 
significant difference between the two samples, matched and fraud, at the year of the trigger event. 
Finally, we investigate whether any accounting variables predict financial distress. We find that 
profitability ratios as well as changes in CFO and auditor are positively and significantly related to 
and therefore predict the absence of financial distress, in contrary to high debt, according to our 
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This thesis is completed with an initial dataset that was made available by Dr. Ullah, initially 
provided by Karpoff, Lee and Martin. The dataset contains important information such as the 
names of companies that are involved in fraudulent activities as well as important event dates that 
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Financial fraud, when caught, could change the future of a company.  A number of research 
papers, newspaper articles and movies discuss the concept of financial fraud and focus on where 
the CEO and/or the CFO ends up after its detection: Gordon Gekko, the fictional character in the 
movie “Wall Street”, is convicted and imprisoned after being convicted of fraud; Jeffrey Skilling, 
former CEO of Enron Corporation was found guilty on conspiracy and security fraud and was 
sentenced to a shortened 13 years in prison. However, it is also important to look at what happens 
to the companies that are involved in the fraudulent activities: How does the market react to the 
announcement of fraud, and subsequently, what kind of changes does the company need to make 
to alleviate any reputational and financial losses?  
In this paper, we examine firms that have attracted scrutiny from the SEC, and have been 
suspected of committing fraudulent activities. We refer to this event as the trigger event. 
Following this announcement, we identify what changes these firms make to escape from negative 
market reaction, or to regain any confidence that was lost during the announcement of fraud. 
While collecting our data, which   initially consisted of 270 firms, we find that 61% of our sample 
ends up changing its CEO within three years of the trigger date, and 65% of the sample changes its 
CFO within the same time period. For these firms, a change in management may mean that the 
firm claims to have gotten rid of the reason for the occurrence of fraud, and that it should reclaim 
confidence from the market following the change. This may not always be the case. In fact, in our 
study, we find that a change in CEO or CFO causes a negative and significant short-term reaction 
by the market, and that these negative abnormal returns turn positive only for the firms that have 
made the management changes quickly after the trigger event. 
Although many papers discuss governance changes that can be made in order to recover any losses 
made by the fraud announcement, the literature regarding the change in top management is 
contradictory and may lead to different interpretations.  For instance, Dikolliet al (2011) find that 
the sample of firms who have kept their CEOs have superior performance compared to their 
counterparts who do not.  
Similarly, Agarwal, Jaffe, Karpoff (1999) study the change in governance of a sample of firms 
following a fraud revelation. They examine how these firms have changed their leadership 
structure to recuperate from losses and find that changing managers after a fraud revelation would 
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not necessarily recuperate the value of the company. They also argue that changing management 
in these cases may have huge implementation costs.  
Other important strategic change is changing the company’s auditing firm. We find that 41% of ou 
sample firms end up changing their auditor around the period of the trigger date. We would expect 
that a change in auditing firm would be good news for the market, which is supported by many 
studies. Vast literature can be found regarding the change in auditors by firms that are involved in 
financial misconduct.  For instance, Hennes, Leone, Miller (2012) find that for a sample of firms 
that have gone through financial restatements, the market responds positively when these firms 
dismiss the already existing auditing firms.  
We also look at company name change following the fraud revelation and expect to find a positive 
market reaction after the change. Few studies have been done regarding this matter. For instance, 
Durrani (2013) finds that if the corporate name change is due to a change in structure, the market 
reaction is significantly positive to this change, and that when the name change is due to a change 
in strategy, the market reaction is significantly negative. In this study, we further discuss different 
tactics and trials to transform the negative returns of a firm following the trigger event. We 
investigate the market reaction to a change in CEO or CFO, that we find attract a negative market 
reaction, except for those firms that make a decision to change their top management quickly after 
the trigger event. We also investigate the positive market reaction to the announcement of change 
in auditing firm and company name. 
We also examine the difference in market reaction and spread values for the fraud firms and 
matched firms. We use size, market to book ratio, industry and Altman-Z score to match 
companies that have similar firm characteristics. Therefore, the only aspect that differentiates the 
two samples is that one sample has been involved in fraudulent activities and the other has not. 
We expect that the fraud sample will be significantly different from the matched sample around 
the announcement of the trigger event.  
Our study also focuses on the presence of information asymmetry during the announcement of the 
trigger event, as well as the change in CEO, CFO and auditing firm. According to Barakat, 
Chernobai and Wahernburg (2014) there is high information asymmetry and effective spread 
widens during operational risk events. We use the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread 
estimator for our sample of firms to study the impact of the above mentioned events on 
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information asymmetry. We find that there is significantly higher spread and thus, information 
asymmetry during the trigger event, litigation date, as well as changes in CEO, CFO and auditor.  
In addition, we examine if accrual models can be used to capture the difference in earnings 
management between the sample that has been involved in fraud and the matched sample. We use 
the discretionary and non-discretionary Jones and Modified Jones models to identify whether the 
two samples are significantly different during the trigger year, as well as the preceding and 
following 2 years and find that the non-discretionary accruals Jones and Modified Jones models 
show a significant difference between the two samples, matched and fraud, around the trigger 
date. 
 
Finally, we investigate whether certain explanatory variables are able to predict bankruptcy or 
the evolution of 3-years mean cumulative abnormal returns, and find that changing the auditing 
firm, an increase in sales and a high ratio of retained earnings to assets predict a lower 
probability of financial distress, as opposed to a high debt ratio, that predicts a high risk of 
financial distress. On the other hand, we find that an increase in ROTA and a quick change in the 
CFO results in a higher mean cumulative abnormal returns, as opposed to the relationship 
between the discretionary Jones Model accrual variables and CAARs, where high accruals 
results in lower mean cumulative abnormal returns. 
We summarize existing literature that is applicable to our study in section 2, we state our 
hypotheses section 3. Then, we discuss the sources and description of our data in section 4 which 
is followed by a description of the methodology used to analyze the data in Section 5. Finally we 
discuss our deduced results in section 6 and conclude in section 7.  
 
2. LITTERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we discuss the literature relevant to topics in our paper. These topics include 
changes in governance after fraud, changes in auditing firms following fraud, information 
asymmetry during news of company misconduct and subsequently internal and external changes 
by the company as well as literature about earnings management and the detection of fraud. 
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2.1 Change in Governance after revelation of fraud: 
Agarwal et al(1999) study the change in governance of a sample of firms following a fraud 
revelation. They look at whether these firms change their leadership structure in order to 
recuperate the reputational loss caused by the fraud announcement. The authors find that changing 
managers after a fraud revelation would not necessarily recuperate the firm value, and that 
sometimes changing managers would have bigger costs of implementation. This would imply that 
changing the CEO or CFO of a company may not always be perceived well by the market.  
In contrast, Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda (2011) study the relationship between CEO tenure and 
firm performance. The authors look at the CEOs who survived re-elections as opposed to their 
matched sample who did not, and find that the sample of firms who have kept their CEOs have 
superior performance. This suggests that the survival of CEOs reduces uncertainty about the 
performance of the firm. Similarly, Bonnier and Bruner (1988) study the abnormal returns at the 
announcement of change in top management of firms that are not performing well.  According to 
their research, there are significantly positive returns following the announcement of the change, 
which would mean that the market has higher expectations from the new management team.  . 
Chi and Sun (2014) agree and find that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
stock performance and CEO and CFO change.  
In the same context, Setiawan (2008) has more mixed results regarding the change in 
management. The author analyzes the market reaction to a change in top management in a sample 
of Indonesian firms.  The author finds a positive reaction to CEO turnover when the new CEO is a 
member of the firm, and a negative one, when the new CEO is an outsider. 
In addition, Karpoff et al(2008) examine the fate of managers that are culpable and find that 
92.4% of these managers lose their job after the fraud has been revealed, the majority of which are 
explicitly fired. 
Finally, Warner et al (1987) examine the relationship between a firm’s returns and change in 
management. The authors find that there are no significant abnormal returns following the 
announcement of a change in top management, be it president, CEO or chairman. The 
insignificance of the returns may be due to the positive reaction of the shareholders following the 
change in top management that is mitigated by the negative reaction of the market regarding the 
performance of the firm. Since our firms are involved in fraudulent activities prior to the change in 
management, we expect that a change in CEO or CFO may attract a negative reaction from the 
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market. We study whether the evolution of the returns after the announcement  remain negative, or 
if it will go upward for those fraud firms that make the decision to change their CEO in a timely 
manner. 
2.2 Announcement of fraud and restatements and market reaction 
Ferris and Pritchard (2001) analyze the market reaction to the revelation of management fraud. 
The authors find that there is a significant and negative market reaction after the initial 
announcement of fraud and a smaller yet negative reaction after the announcement of litigation. 
Also, they find that the results of the decisions following the litigation do not effect returns, since 
there has been a significant negative market reaction following the announcement of the potential 
fraud. Similarly, Palmrose, Richardson and Scholtz (2004) investigate the abnormal returns 
following the restatements of a sample of firms involving fraudulent activities. The authors find a 
negative reaction by the market resulting from the restatement involving fraud.  
Kedia and Philippon (2006), on the other hand, look at different variables while examining the 
effect of fraud on companies as they examine the economic results of fraudulent activities. The 
authors find that after the detection of fraud, firms decrease their labor and therefore, their 
productivity improves. Economically, the authors find that this is the reason behind improved 
performance during periods of low employment and diminished economic growth. 
2.3 Company name change: 
Durrani (2013) studies the effect of company name change on the stock price and volume in a 
sample of Canadian firms. The author finds different results to the different name change 
categories. The author concludes that if the corporate name change is due to a change in structure, 
the market reaction is significantly positive to this change, and that when the name change is due 
to a change in strategy, the market reaction is significantly negative. 
 
2.4 Change in auditing company and company performance 
Agarwal and Cooper (forthcoming, 2016) find that auditor turnover is higher for the sample of 
restating firms than their matched counterpart. This might imply that these companies would make 
such a strategic decision to regain market confidence. Siew Hong Teoh (2012) find that the 
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reaction of the market following the change in auditor is dependent on the characteristics of the 
firm and that for the sample of firms that have low firm value, the market reacts positively to the 
change in auditor. Hennes et al (2012) study whether financial restatements cause the dismissal of 
the auditors of the firm and  the market reaction to a change in auditors and find that the market 
responds positively to a change in auditor, specifically if the new auditor is a larger more 
successful one. The authors therefore find that a change in auditor, specifically when the new 
auditor is a Big 4, restores the credibility of the company and stress the importance of auditors in 
the financial reporting of a firm.  
 
2.5 Information asymmetry  
Cerqueria and Pereira (2015) examine the high-low spread and associate it with the impact of 
information asymmetry and financial reporting quality. Similarly, we  use the estimator by Corwin 
and Schultz (2012) who have developed a high-low spread estimator from daily high and low 
prices in order to study the variance of the bid-ask spread. The high-low spread estimator may be 
used to study asset-pricing, information asymmetry and market efficiency practices. We also use 
Barakat et al (2014) as a guide. They examine the magnitude of information asymmetry around 
periods of operational risk events by using effective spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. 
The authors find that effective spread increase around the first announcement of such events, 
specifically when the companies are known to have been involved in fraudulent activities and 
weak business practices. 
2.6 Earnings Management  
Kothari et al (2002) study earnings management and market efficiency by looking at discretionary 
accruals. The authors look at both performance matched accrual measures and traditional accrual 
measures and conclude that the use of performance matched accrual measures (i.e. on ROA) is 
more reliable than the latter. In the same context, Jones et al (2007) use 9 different accrual models 
to study earnings management and examine whether fraudulent activities and financial 
restatements can be detected through the discretionary Jones and modified Jones accrual models. 
The authors find that accrual estimation errors may be used to anticipate and discover fraud. We 
study both models for discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and expect to find significant 
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differences between our fraud and matched samples. In the same logic, Bartov and Gul (2000) 
study the Jones model and the modified Jones model to identify earnings management in cross 
sectional models versus time-series models, and find that the cross-sectional Jones and modified 
Jones models perform better the times-series models in identifying earnings management.  These 
findings allow the research of a larger sample size, since the firms that have a short survival rate 
would also be included in the research. Finally, Gomez et al (2000) examine the discretionary 
accruals model and find its relationship with future performance and stock returns and find that a 
discretionary accruals model may predict the future performance of a company and its stock 
returns. 
 
2.7 CEO and CFO characteristics and engagement in fraudulent activities 
Ge et al (2011) investigate the effect of CFO characteristics (age, tenure, gender, education) on 
their accounting decisions, on the possibility of these individuals engaging in fraudulent activities 
and They find that CFO characteristics does have an effect on their accounting decision-making, 
and that in case of fraudulent activities carried by a CFO, changing that CFO would have 
significant implications on the firm’s financial reporting strategy. Similarly, Karpoff, et al(2007) 
study a sample of individuals that are responsible for financial misrepresentations (CEO, president 
chairman etc.…) and find that these managers are more likely to lose their job following the fraud 
revelation. 
Another interesting paper by Khanna et al (2015) discusses the likelihood of the dismissal of a 
CEO after the detection of fraud, when these CEOs are connected to the board of directors, or 
other managers of a firm. The paper further discusses how the market, specifically investors, 
regulators and other specialists react to the appointment of these CEOs. This is relevant in our 
study when looking at the abnormal returns from the market to the CEOs after the detection and to 
explain that magnitude of the reaction of the market. 
2.8 Prediction of Financial Distress: 
Early prediction of financial distress is key for institutions and investors to protect their financial 
investments. Many researchers have discussed the prediction of financial distress in depth. For 
instance, Altman (1968) estimates the likelihood of distress of firms by comparing companies 
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that have gone bankrupt compared to another sample who was not. However, bankruptcy has not 
been the only proxy for distress in literature. Other studies use different proxies to define 
financial distress of a firm. Theodossiou et al (1996) use a sample of firms that have gone 
through an M&A and have used this characteristic to compare to other firms that have not and 
thus, to predict financial distress. They do so by comparing firms that are healthy and others that 
are distressed, and study whether the latter sample are acquired. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES  
The interest of this study is to examine a sample of firms that have been involved in fraudulent 
activities and control it with another that has not. We study market reaction and information 
asymmetry around the trigger event, which is known to be the first indication of a company’s 
involvement in fraud as well as other events following the trigger date. We examine significant 
differences in returns and spread during changes in CEO, CFO, auditing firm and company name. 
An extensive literature investigates a company’s involvement in fraud, how to anticipate, detect 
that involvement, and how to overcome any reputational losses. 
Vast research discuss the aftermath of the revelation of fraud or financial restatements. Ferris and 
Pritchard (2001) and Palmrose, Richardson and Scholtz (2004) find that the announcement of a 
restatement or of misconduct by a company is followed by a negative reaction by the market. In 
light of this information, our first hypothesis is:  
H1: There is a significant and negative market reaction for the original sample after the 
announcement of a trigger event, compared to a non-significant market reaction to the control 
sample at the same date.  
Agarwal, Jaffe, Karpoff (1999) find that changing managers after a fraud revelation would not 
necessarily recuperate the firm value, and contrarily, findings by Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda 
(2011) Bonnier and Bruner (1988) that conclude that the sample of firms who have kept their 
CEOs have superior performance and significantly positive returns following the announcement of 
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the change. This suggests that the survival of executives of a company reduces uncertainty about 
the performance of the firm. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
H2a: There is a significant negative market reaction for the original sample following the 
announcement of CEO and CFO change. 
H2b: Firms that are able change their CEO or CFO quickly after the announcement of a 
trigger event are able to regain market confidence in the long-term. 
Firing the existing auditing firm may be a strategic move to alleviate the negative reaction by the 
market. In this context, Hennes, Leone, Miller (2012) find that the market responds positively to a 
change in auditor, specifically if the new auditor is a larger more successful one and that the 
auditor restores the credibility of the company. Their findings stress the importance of auditors in 
the financial reporting of a firm. There for Hypothesis 2c is: 
H2c: There is a significant positive market reaction for the original fraud sample following 
the announcement of an auditor change. 
Research regarding company name change is not vastly available in literature. One of few studies 
is that of Durani (2013) who finds that if the corporate name change is due to a change in 
structure, the market reaction is significantly positive to this change, and that when the name 
change is due to a change in strategy, the market reaction is significantly negative. These findings 
would lead us to Hypothesis 2d. 
H2d: There is a significant positive market reaction for the original fraud sample following 
the announcement of name change. 
For our third hypothesis, it is important to note Ferris and Pritchard (2001), who discuss market 
reaction following announcement of fraud followed by the filing of a lawsuit and find that there is 
a negative and significant reaction by the market for the first event, and a less significant but 
negative reaction for the second. Thus, our next hypothesis is: 
H3: There is a significant negative market reaction for the original fraud sample following the 
announcement of a class action 
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In addition, detailed literature exists around the presence information around difference 
announcements, good or bad news. An interesting paper to note here is one by Barakat, Chernobai 
and Wahrenburg (2014) who examine the magnitude of information asymmetry around periods of 
operational risk events and find that effective spread and therefore information asymmetry 
increases around the first announcement of such events, specifically when the companies are 
known to have been involved in fraudulent activities and weak business practices. Thus hypothesis 
4 and 5 are as follow: 
H4: For the original sample, there is a higher information asymmetry following the 
announcement of a trigger event, compared to the control sample. 
H5: For the original sample, there is higher information asymmetry at the announcement of 
change in CEO and CFO and auditing firm 
we study earnings management through models discussed in Jones et al (2007) who use 9 different 
accrual models to study earnings management and examine whether fraudulent activities and 
financial restatements can be detected through the discretionary Jones and modified Jones accrual 
models. The authors find that accrual estimation errors may be used to anticipate and discover 
fraud, which would lead us to the following hypothesis. 
H6: The Jones and Modified Jones models show that there is a significant difference between 
the fraud and matched samples which leads us to distinguish between the two samples. 
It is also important to predict how some firms may end up being bankrupt, acquired or deleted 
from a certain exchange. The prediction of financial distress is key for institutions and investors to 
protect their financial investments, we investigate different tactics and variables that could predict 
financial distress. In this context, Altman (1968) estimates the likelihood of distress of firms by 
comparing companies that have gone bankrupt compared to another sample who was not. 
However, bankruptcy has not been the only proxy for distress in literature. Other studies use 
different proxies to define financial distress of a firm. Theodossiou et al (1996) use a sample of 
firms that have gone through an M&A and have used this characteristic to compare to other firms 
that have not and thus, to predict financial distress. They do so by comparing firms that are healthy 
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and others that are destressed, and study whether the latter sample are acquired. This leads us to 
our next hypothesis: 
 H7: Financial distress may be predicted by studying the relationship certain explanatory 
variables such as profitability and debt ratios, CEO/CFO/auditor changes with the probability of 
bankruptcy, M&A and Deletion from an exchange.  
Finally, we will investigate how certain explanatory variables such as liquidity, debt, market ratios 
may explain the trend of the mean cumulative abnormal returns. In this context, Martani et 
al(2009) study certain financial information and investigate whether the explanatory variables 
significantly explain the trend of the stock returns. This leads us to our next and final hypothesis: 
H8: The evolution of mean cumulative abnormal returns may be explained by certain 
accounting information and ratios. 
 
4. DATA 
Our initial sample consists of 300 North American firms that have been involved in fraudulent 
activities
1
. The sample contains data with their trigger event ranging from 1997 to 2011, with 
additional 2 years preceding and following the trigger event to identify earnings management 
around the trigger event. For each of the sample firms, we identify their beginning and end of 
violation date, trigger date, and regulation period, as well as other variables such as date of change 
in CEO, CFO, auditor and filing name. As the main characteristic shared by most of the sample 
firms, we identify the trigger date of each firm as the date where a company has drawn the SEC’s 
scrutiny.  
The sample is then reduced to 270 firms, as specific fraud trigger dates are not obtained for some 
of the firms. Table 1 shows the industries to which our original sample firms belong to, as well as 
their SIC code and frequency as a percentage of the total sample. Also, in the process of cleaning 
                                                             
1 We thank Karpoff, Lee and Martin (KLM) for generously providing us with their dataset. KLM dataset contains 
the names of the companies that have been involved in fraudulent activities as well as important events such as 
violation period dates, trigger date, regulation period dates. We have obtained information concerning CEO and 
CFO characteristics such as age and tenure, as well as auditing firm names and change dates and litigation dates. 
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and managing the data, the sample is reduced to 235 firms, for each of which we obtain the 
GVKEYs to complete our research.  
For each of the sample firms, information about the CEO/CFO name, age, tenure and 
announcements in change in executives is hand-collected from SEC EDGAR filings, specifically 
in the 10K, 10K/A and DEF14A filings. The hand collected data contains specific dates of 
announcement of top management changes in top management and the change in the number of 
affiliated and non-affiliated members of the company. Information about auditor changes is 
collected from MergentOnline and class action filing dates are collected for our sample of firms 
from Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. 
Following the collection of the specified event dates for each company, our sample is again 
reduced to 190 firms. This was due to the size of some of the firms in the sample and their 
information availability on COMPUSTAT database. In order to better study the effect of the 
trigger events on our sample, we proceed by creating a control sample, and matching each firm in 
our sample with another with similar characteristics. We look at the difference between our 
sample of firms and their matched firms in order to make conclusions about what draws both 
samples apart.  
Thus, our sample of firm is matched against firms with similar characteristics, such as size, value, 
industry and financial distress measured by total assets, Market-to-Book ratio, SIC and Altman Z-
score. It is important to note that our sample firms are matched with others that are within 70% up 
to 130% range of their total assets. , the Altman Z-score
2
 is also used as a matching characteristic, 
as it measures a company’s financial strength and its likelihood of bankruptcy, as studied in the 
Altman (2000).  
 
4.1 Variables Used in the Study  
We obtain our data from different sources and databases. COMPUSTAT (North America- 
Fundamentals Annual) is used to get financial information about the fraud and matched samples.  
                                                             
2 The Altman-Z by using the following function that consists of several financial ratios: 
 
        
               
            
     
                
            
    
    
            
    
                      
                 
    
     




In addition, the Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP) variables are used to calculate the 
High-Low Spread. For its calculation, we use daily high, low and closing prices, as well as 
volume. Also, CRSP value weighted returns are used to look at market reaction and abnormal 
returns following specified events for both the fraud and control samples.  
In addition, SEC EDGAR is used for the hand-collection of CEO, CFO and board information, 
which includes the name, age, tenure of executives as well as any change in top management or 
company filing names. Finally, we use MergentOnline and Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse to obtain auditor change announcement and class action announcement dates, 
respectively and Bloomberg and Equilar Atlas to obtain any other missing information. 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
We calculate summary statistics of all the variables used in this paper one year before the fraud 
trigger date. The results are shown in Table 2, where compare the differences in mean of both the 
fraud and matched samples, and look at the sign of the mean difference and its significance.  
Regarding the total assets, used as a proxy for size, and one of our matching criteria, we notice 
that the fraud and matched samples are not different, with a non-significant p-value of 0.979. Also, 
we find that the mean and median values for total assets of the matched sample is higher than that 
of the fraud sample (33,264 Vs 33,608 and 1397.911 Vs 1497.73, respectively). The difference is 
not significant for these values, as the firms have been matched by size. 
Regarding the earnings before interest and taxes, we see that the matched samples has marginally 
higher mean and median values than the fraud sample, but their difference in mean is not 
significant, with a p-value of 0.448. 
When looking at total liabilities, we see that there is no significant difference between the means 
of the fraud and matched samples. When looking at the debt ratio, both samples have similar 
ratios, with 0.866 for the fraud sample and 0.877 for the matched sample. 
For the retained earnings, we see that the fraud sample has retained close to 25% more earnings 
than their control sample. There is not a significant difference in the means with the p-value of 
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0.618 and the median values are 9783.47 for the fraud sample and 6375.14 for the matched 
sample. 
As for the market-to-book ratio, we notice that there is no significant difference, as the two 
samples are matched to have similar company values, with a non-significant p-value of 0.9998. 
Their means (4.434 for fraud VS 4.435 for matched), medians and standard deviations are all 
almost equal.  
The Altman Z-score, one of our matching criteria, there is no significant difference between the 
fraud and matched samples with non-significant p-value 0.5132. 
For the current liabilities, we notice that the means of both samples are very close, with a p-value 
of 0.94 but a higher dispersion for the matched sample in terms of difference between the standard 
deviations (239.7 for fraud sample and 147.73 for the matched sample). 
For the net sales variable, we see that the sales of the fraud sample of firms is only 10% more than 
that of the matched sample. Also the standard deviation of the matched sample is higher. 
5 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Event Study around Fraud Announcement 
We study the difference between the two samples before and after an announcement has drawn the 
attention of the SEC, referred to the trigger date: the original fraud sample and the matched sample 
that has not been involved in fraudulent activities. We use the daily event study methodology 
3
to 
study the market reaction before and after the announcement. 
We use the estimation period (-301,-46) for both the market and Fama French models. We will 
closely look at the value weighted market model, both in short-term and long term periods. It is 
important to note that the calculated returns are market-adjusted and that we look at the CAARs in 
different windows ranging from -30 to +365 days in order to see the long and short-term 
implications of the presence and absence of a fraud event. 
                                                             
3 The following assumptions are made for the event study methodology: (1) Event studies assume market efficiency 
(2)Event studies provide (2) Stock returns belong to a normal distribution (3)Although the event must be forseen, we 
do expect some anticipation before the trigger event, as well as the change in CEO/CFO auditor and name change. 
(4)There are no other coonfounding effects during the event (5) the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used for 
the methodology of the event study. 
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i. Market Model 
In order to calculate the abnormal returns of a firm, there are two steps to cover. The first the 
actual return Rit   of security ‘i’ at day ‘t’, and the other, E (Rit)  which is the expected return of 
security ‘i’ at day ‘t’. Thus, the abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the 
expected return. Subsequently,          
                                      ARit= Rit – E (Rit)                                                         (1) 
It is important to also note that the actual return Rit is calculated by adding the return on the market 
    and the error term ε t.                                                       (2) 
Finally, we obtain the cumulative abnormal return values with the following formula. This 
formula is also formulated by Mackinlay (1997):   
                                      CAR (t1,t2) =     
  
                                                     (3) 
We would expect that following the trigger event, there will be a negative reaction by the market 
for the simple of firms that might been involved in fraudulent acitivites. 
ii Fama French Model 
Another model that is used in this study is the Fama French Model. This model looks at other firm 
specific characteristics, such as size, book to market and momentum. This would lead us to the 
following formula: 
 
                                                                   (4) 
 
Where, Rit represents the return on the stock i at day t,    stands for the risk free return at day t, 
     represents the return of the market at day t, SMB stands for the difference between small and 
big firm returns, HML is the difference between high and low book to market ratios.  
 
Similarly to the market model, we will look at the sign and significance of both short term and 
long term abnormal returns. We would expect to find that there is a negative market reaction for 
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the fraud sample following the trigger event and the possibility of fraudulent activities, when 
controlled with the matched sample. 
 
5.2 Event Study around CEO, CFO, Auditor and Name Change Announcement  
For this second event study, we study the market reaction to a CEO, CFO, auditor or name change 
announcement. With this analysis, we study the market adjusted value-weighted monthly 
abnormal returns are looking to see whether the firms that make changes in their top management, 
their auditing firm or their filing name will be able to recuperate from the negative market reaction 
and whether the ARs in the long term will return to their estimated levels.   
When investigating the change in CEO or CFO, we use an monthly event study 
4
with an 
estimation period of (-42,-6) for both the market and Fama-French models and look at different  
monthly windows ranging from -6 to + 24 to study both the short and long term implications of 
the change announcement.  
5.3 High-Low Spread 
For the calculation of the spread, we refer to the methodology used by Corwin and Schultz (2011), 
where the authors use the following steps to calculate the spread estimates. First, it is important to 
adjust for overnight prices, so that the daily high-low ratios reflect the difference between high 
and low prices during trading hours.  Since stock prices may also move significantly during non-
trading periods or overnight, we will adjust the t+1 prices with the difference between the closing 
price at day t and the low price in t+1. 
In addition, due to a high variances in the years t and t+1, the spread could have a negative sign. In 
order to accurately calculate the spread estimates for those days, we will set the spread values to 0. 
We calculate the spread using the daily bid, ask and closing prices as well as the volume to 
identify the non-trading days obtained on CRSP. 
In order to study the information asymmetry around the event day 0, we use an estimation period 
of (-290,-45) in order to calculate the expected spread. We then calculate the actual spread 
                                                             
4 A monthy event study is better suited to investigate long-term implications of an event. This methodology uses the 
mothly excess returns for each firm at month t. 
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estimates using bid, ask and closing prices and finally, compute the difference between the two, in 




5.4        Earnings Management Models 
 
 
a. A measure of discretionary accruals: The JONES model6: 
 
                                                                               (5)          
       
Where      is the total accruals for firm i at year t,        is the total assets for firm i at year t-1, 
       is the change in Sales from year t-1 to year t for firm i at year t,       is the Gross 
property, plant and equipment variable. 
The cross-sectional Jones model is more effective in detecting earning management than its time-
series counterpart and will be used in our study.  
 
b. MJONES: Modified JONES model: 
 
                                                                      (6) 
 
Where       represents the change in is Accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
On the contrary, the MJONES or Modified Jones model discussed thoroughly by Dechow et al. 
(1995)  detects earnings management more accurately by looking at an additional variable, change 
in accounts receivable and make an assumption that sales that have not yet been paid for  are due 
to earnings management. 
                                                             
5 We also examine the mean cumulative abnormal spread estimates, calculated as the sum of the average spread 
estimates over t days, to get a better sense of the aggregate effect of abnormal spread, specifically if the effect of the 
event does not discontinue at the event day itself, but is effective over a period of time. 
6 We will study both the non-discretionary and discretionary Jones Models, where non-discretioanry model reflects 
the operating cycle of the firm and the discretionary model, that reflects management choices. 
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Both the Jones and Modified Jones will be used to examine if they can be used to capture the 
difference in earnings management between the sample that has been involved in fraud and its 
matched sample for the 2 years before and after the trigger event. 
 
 
5.5 Prediction of Distress: Bankruptcy, Mergers & Acquisitions and Dropped firms 
Many researchers have used Bankruptcy as the definition of distress. Altman (1968) estimates 
the likelihood of distress of firms by comparing firms that have gone bankrupt and those that 
have not. However, other studies use different proxies to define financial distress of a firm. 
Theodossiou et al (1996) use a sample of firms that have merged or have been acquired as one of 
their variables to predict financial distress amongst firms. They do so by comparing firms that 
are healthy and others that are financially destressed, and study whether the latter sample are 
acquired. 
We will use the three mentioned dependent variables, whether the firm has gone bankrupt, if 
they have merged or been acquired or whether they have been dropped from an exchange as 
proxies for financial distress.  
We will use the following models to predict financial distress: 
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, the CEO dummy takes a 
value of 1 if the firm has changed the COE in the first 6 months, 0 otherwise, the CFO dummy 
takes a value of 1 when the firm has change the CFO in the first 6 months, 0 otherwise and the 
auditor dummy takes a value of 1 if the firm has changed the auditing company in the first 6 





5.6             Evolution of 3-Year CAARs. 
Financial reports may contain accounting information that provide ratios and other variables (debt 
ratio, profitability ratio, sales etc.… ) that are able to predict how the stock returns of a firm may 
evolve. Martani (2009) use profitability, debt, size and market ratios as proxies for accounting 
information and investigate their relationship with firms’ the mean cumulative abnormal returns. 
They find that the profitability, turnover have a significant impact on the CAARs. In this section, 
we will use OLS regressions to investigate the evolution of 3-year cumulative average abnormal 
returns and investigate the relationship between explanatory variables and the dependant variable. 
We will also use the method of two dimension clustering
7
 as a robustness check to control for 
correlation between firms at a moment of time.  
We will estimate the following model to further investigate the relationship between explanatory 
variables and the evolution of CAARs: 
                                  
                 
            
    
 
                 
 
               
                                           
 
6 EMPREICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Event Study: 
In this part, we investigate the market reaction following the announcements of the possibility of 
detection of fraud, and the announcement of other changes that companies make following the 
trigger event in order to minimize the effect of the market following the fraud detection 
announcement. 
                                                             
7 We use the Kellogg School of Management Programming techniques that discuss the two dimension clustering and 
run an OLS regression and calculate standard errors which account for two dimensions: firm and time. This method 




We use both Market Model and Fama-French daily and monthly event studies and study the 
abnormal returns around trigger events, CEO change announcements, CFO change 
announcements, auditor change announcements, name change announcements and class action 
announcements. Also, we compare our fraud and matched samples at the trigger date and look at 
whether the two samples are significantly different. To conserve space, we only report the Market 
–Adjusted returns in our results for the mentioned event studies. 
In the first subpart, we look at our full original fraud sample for each of the mentioned 
announcements. In the second subpart, we compare our two samples and make conclusions 
regarding the magnitude of their difference.  
i.) Event study: The Original Fraud Sample 
Using the market model, we first obtain the value weighted market-adjusted returns for the 
original sample at the trigger event. We see that there are daily significant and negative abnormal 
returns that start 8 days before the trigger date. We see in figure 1, panel a, that at day -8, there is a 
negative abnormal return of -0.55%, significant at 0.01. This trend continues, with an abnormal 
return of -1.04% at day -2, significant at 0.001. This shows that the information has leaked and 
that the market anticipates the event, thus the negative reaction. At day 0, we see a very significant 
and negative abnormal return of -13.37%, significant at 0.001. Following day 0, the downward 
trend continues,  we notice that for a week after the fraud date, on a daily basis, more than at least 
50% of our sample firms have negative abnormal returns (170 out of 202 firms are negative at day 
0, 113 out of 200 firms are negative on day 6). In table 3, we also see a Z-value of -8.636 
significant at 0.001 in the (0, +1) event window. The negative trend continues after the event date, 
seen in event window (0, +7) that has a mean cumulative abnormal return of -13.6% significant at 
0.001, but seems to alleviate after a week from the announcement of the fraud. We see a positive 
and significant returns of 1.86% and 0.48% at days 12 and 14, respectively. This may be due to 
some actions that some companies might be taking action following the fraud announcement such 




  Using a monthly event study, we obtain the value-weighted market adjusted returns for the event 
period around the change in CEO. In the results, we see that at month 0, there is a negative 
abnormal return of -4.51% significant at 0.1. Also looking at the event windows in table 4, we 
notice that at window (-1, 0), there is a significantly negative abnormal return of -6.13% with 71 
of the firms that have changed their CEOs having negative ARs. This demonstrates that the market 
believes that a change in CEO is a desperate move by the company to regain some of the 
confidence of the market. In the months following the event month, we do not see any significant 
trends in the abnormal returns, which would lead us to look more closely at the sample of firms 
that have changed their CEOs, and how quickly they have done that change. In this context, figure 
2, panel A shows that firms that have changed their CEO quickly, in this case after up to 3 months, 
tend to have an upward trend in their abnormal returns lasting up to 2 years. This could be 
compared to the other 3 subsamples that represent firms that have changed their CEO after 3 to 6 
months, 6 to 12 months, and 12 to 24 months. We see that for the 3 latter subsamples, after the 
negative trend around the announcement of the change of CEO, there is no good news, and the 
market keeps reacting negatively or stabilizes at negative CAR values. This leads to support our 
hypothesis 2b, which states that firms that act quickly in changing their CEO are able to 
experience positive ARs and a positive market reaction in the longer-term. This indicates that a 
CEO that was chosen to replace another early after fraud detection is more likely to regain the 
market confidence. 
Similarly with our sample that has changed their CFO following the trigger date, we see in table 
5, that there are significant abnormal returns in the event period (-6,-2) which may itself be due 
to the announcement, followed by a negative and significant market reaction at (-1,0), with a Z-
value of -1.898 significant at 10%, and where 72 of the 132 firms have negative mean 
cumulative abnormal returns. This subsample also has a negative abnormal return of -4.47% at 
month -1.  Following the event month 0, we notice that there is a mixed reaction from the market 
and it would be hard to make conclusions looking at the full sample of firms that have changed 
their CFO. Thus, we divide the sample into subsamples, according to how quickly the firms have 
changed their CFO. We obtain clearer results that are very similar to our results for the CEO 
sample. Looking at the cumulative abnormal returns in figure 2 panel B, we see that for all the 
subsamples there is a negative trend before the event month, which would be the effect of the 
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announcement. Following the event month, we see an upward trend, in the long term, for the 
subsample that has changed their CFO quickly, and negative CARs for the other samples. This 
confirms our findings in the CEO sample, and supports hypothesis 2b, which states that firms 
that change their CFO quickly will have positive ARs in the long-term. This again indicates that 
a change in leadership may be a good tactic to recuperate loss, as long as the targeted company 
makes quick and confident decision in replacing the existing CFO. 
Hypothesis 2c states that there is positive market reaction when a firm that has been possibly 
involved in fraudulent activities changes its auditing firm. Here, we notice that at day 0 there is a 
positive abnormal return 1.66% significant at 0.001, followed by a negative abnormal return of -
0.81% significant at 0.01 at day 1. In order to fully grasp our results, we also look at the event 
windows around the event date. We see that during the event periods shown in table 6, the 
windows (-2,+2), (-1,+1), (0,+1), (0,+7) have positive abnormal returns of  1.37% (significant at 
0.1), 1.42% (significant at 0.01), 0.85% (significant at 0.1), and 4.02% (significant at 0.001), 
respectively. These results show a positive and significant market reaction following the 
announcement of the auditing change, which agree with out hypothesis 2d. We continue by 
dividing the sample of firms that have changed their auditing firm into 3 subsamples. The first 
subsample, where the firms involved in fraud change their auditor in the first year and the second 
subsample, where the firms involved change their auditing firm after a year and up to 3 years. in 
figure 2, panel C, we compare both subsamples and conclude that the subsample that changes its 
auditing firm faster has positive and significant abnormal returns that continue a positive trend 
up to a year. In contrast, we notice that there is not much change in the sample that makes an 
auditor change a year following the trigger event. 
Regarding the announcement of class action, we hypothesize that following the announcement of 
a lawsuit, there would logically be a negative reaction by the market. The results in figure 1, 
panel b, show that there are negative and significant abnormal returns that start 8 days before the 
event. This would imply that the market has anticipated the event, thus its negative reaction. For 
the days -5 and -4, the abnormal returns are -0.86% and -1.04%, respectively, significant at 0.01. 
For the days -1 and 0, close to the event, the abnormal returns are -3.31% and -2.36%, 
respectively, both significant at 0.001. For the event windows surrounding the event day 0 shown 
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in table 8, we see that there are negative and significant returns for the event windows (-2,+2), (-
1,+1), (0,+1) and (0,+7). 
For the sample of firms involved in fraud that change their names after trigger event, the results 
are not very significant. There is a negative and non-significant abnormal return of -0.18% at day 
-1, followed by -0.01 at day 0. Similarly, event windows (-1, +1) and (0, +1) have non-
significant mean cumulative abnormal returns of 0.59% and 0.77%, respectively. When looking 
at the evolution of mean CARs in figure 1, panel c, we see that there is a upward trend, before 
and after the name change announcement, which may imply good news from the market.  
Finally, we investigate and compare our sample firms that have made all three changes: CEO, 
CFO and auditor to other samples that have made 2 changes of the mentioned as well as upto one 
change. In figure 4, we find the subsample that has changed their CEO, CFO and auditor 
performs better after a year to the trigger date, as opposed to the other subsamples that are not 
able to recuperate their losses.  
ii.) Event Study: The Matched Sample 
To compare the two matched samples, we obtain the market adjusted value weighted returns and 
compare them. For the firms in the new fraud sample, each of which has been matched with a 
firm that has similar size, value and financial distress characteristics, we find that the market 
anticipates the bad news before the trigger event. At day -14, we find an abnormal return of -
3.41% and another negative abnormal return of -4.49% at day -8, both returns significant at 
0.001. At day 0, the abnormal return of -12.68%, significant at 0.001 shows a negative market 
reaction, as hypothesized. In contrast, for our matched sample, we find a non-significant 
abnormal return of -0.47% at day 0, which shows no significant market reaction. Also, we find a 
non-significant mean cumulative abnormal return of -0.33% for the event window (-1, 0) for our 
matched sample compared to a significant mean cumulative abnormal return of -12.22%, 
significant at 0.001 for the fraud sample. Similarly, we find a non-significant mean cumulative 
abnormal return of 0.02 for the event window (0,+1) for our matched sample compared to a 
significant mean cumulative abnormal return of -12.24%, significant at 0.001 for the fraud 
sample. We also notice in the evolution of the CARs seen in figure 3 that the two samples split 
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around 15 days to day 0, which shows anticipation by the market regarding the detection of fraud 
for the fraud sample. At day 0, there is an abrupt decrease in CARs for the fraud sample, which 
completely divides both samples. Following the day 3, we see a parallel progress of both 
samples, with the fraud sample having 20% lower CARs. By comparing the fraud and matched 
samples, we see that although fraud firms and matched firms have similar size, value and 
financial distress values, the fraud firm is exposed to significantly more negative abnormal 
returns from the market, which agrees with our first hypothesis. 
6.2 High-Low Spread: Information Asymmetry  
The information asymmetry is known to increase during bad news events (Barakat et al (2014)). 
We use the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread estimator for our sample of firms to 
study the impact of trigger event, change in CEO, CFO and auditing firm. In order to capture the 
effect of the trigger announcement on our sample, we use the matched sample as comparison. In 
subpart 1, we compare the fraud and matched samples in terms of spread and look at the 
evolution of information asymmetry during the trigger event. In subpart 2, we look at changes 
that firms may make, be it change in CEO, CFO, auditor and the effect these announcements 
have on spread and information asymmetry. 
 
i. High-Low Spread : Fraud Sample vs. Matched Sample 
When examining the high-low spread results for our fraud sample, we use our matched sample to 
control for the ongoing downward trend of the high-low spread in the previous years. 
In table 9, we see that for most of the studied windows, we have significantly positive mean 
cumulative abnormal spread values. For instance, in event window (-30,-2), there is a spread 
value of 0.00123 significant at 0.0001. This may show that the market has anticipated the 
announcement, and there is an increase in information asymmetry and therefore the high-low 
spread. When comparing with the matched sample, we find that there is a mean difference of 
0.0012, which shows that the two samples are significantly different. Similarly, in event window 
(-1,+1), we notice that the two samples have a difference of means of 0.00416 significant at 0.05, 
which shows that the fraud sample has significantly higher spread values than its counterpart. 
This trend continues for the latter event windows. We notice that most of the matched sample 
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windows are significantly different from the fraud sample. This supports our hypothesis 4 that 
states that around the announcement of fraud, there is an increase in information asymmetry and 
therefore the high-low spread, compared to the other firms that have not been involved in 
fraudulent activities. 
 
ii. High-Low Spread: Announcement of change in CEO, CFO and Auditing firm 
 
When studying the effect of the trigger announcement amongst a firm, it is important to look at 
what changes the firms make in order to recuperate any losses that they might make. In this 
context, it is important to look at the information asymmetry and therefore spread evolution 
when the companies that might have been involved in fraudulent activities make changes in top 
management or their auditing firms. In table 10, column 1 we see that the firms that change their 
CEO after the trigger event are exposed to high spread values around the period of the change in 
CEO. This again may be due to the difference in knowledge of information surrounding the 
announcement. Thus, there would be an increase in information asymmetry and therefore spread 
for our fraud sample. When we look at the event windows in table 10, we see that there are 
significant and positive abnormal spread values in the periods surrounding the announcement of 
change in CEO. For instance, in monthly event windows (-1, +1) and (0, +1), there are mean 
cumulative abnormal spread values of 0.00213 and 0.00239, both positive and significant at 
0.0001. This shows a high level of information asymmetry before, on, and after month of the 
announcement. The results suggest that the market is unsure about the implications of the change 
in CEO and how the company will do after the change. We also look at the event windows after 
the announcement, up to month +6, and we notice that the market is still unsure about the 
change, and that the information asymmetry is still present. This agrees with hypothesis 4, which 
states that there is an increase in information asymmetry during the first announcement of an 
event, in this case, the trigger event. 
For the companies that have changed their CFO after the trigger event, the results are similar. In 
table 10, column 2, we notice significant and positive mean cumulative abnormal spread values 
of 0.00322 and 0.00328 for the monthly event windows (-1,0) and (0,+1), both significant at 
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0.0001. Similarly to the sample that changed their CEO, the significant and positive mean 
abnormal spread values continue during the event month 0 and 6 months after the event month. 
These findings agree with our hypothesis 5 that states that the announcement to change a CFO 
will create information asymmetry in the market and therefore high values of high-low spread. 
According to our findings regarding the change in the auditing firm, we notice that the results are 
not as significant as the ones mentioned earlier, regarding the changes in CEO and CFO. for 
instance, at for event windows (0,+7), (1,+5),(+5,+10) and (1,+15), the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns are all not significant as opposed to the windows (-1,+1),(0,+1), (-2,+2) and 
(+10,+30) that are all significant at 0.05. This would agree with hypothesis 5, that an 
announcement in change in auditor creates a significant increase in information asymmetry and 
therefore spread. These results also may suggest that information asymmetry is not as high when 
the announcement is good news, as in when the market reaction and abnormal returns were 
tested positive and significant, as mentioned earlier in our study. 
 
6.3 Earnings Management: Accrual Models 
We use the Jones and Modified Jones Models to accurately detect earnings management. The 
models take into account the change in total assets from year t-1 to year t, the change in sales 
from year -1 to year 0, the change in gross property, plant and equipment from year -1 to year 0 
as well as the change in accounts receivable  ( only for the Modified Jones model). In Tables 11 
and 12, we see that for the years -2 and -1 from the trigger event, the mean values for total 
accruals are lower for the fraud sample, but that the two samples are not significantly different 
for any of the models. 
For year 0, shown in table 13, we notice that there are two accrual models that show a significant 
difference between the fraud and matched samples. The  Non-Discretionary current accruals- 
Jones model shows that the difference in means between the two samples is -0.022, the matched 
sample having a lower total accruals value, and that the difference is significant at 0.10. 
Similarly, for the Modified Jones nondiscretionary accruals model, we notice that the matched 
sample has a significantly lower mean, a difference of -0.023, significant at 0.10 These findings 
suggest that for year 0, year of the occurrence of the trigger event, the two samples are 
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significantly different in mean total accrual estimates, the fraud sample having significantly 
higher and positive mean values than its matched counterpart.  
We also report earnings management at year +1 and year +2 from the trigger event. We find that 
for Nondiscretionary Current Accruals for the Jones and modified Jones models, there is a mean 
difference of -0.135 and 0.15, respectively, both significant at 0.001. 
 
Thus, in accordance with hypothesis 6, since the non-discretionary Jones and Modified Jones 
models show a significant difference between the two samples, the models are able to detect the 
firms involved in fraudulent earnings as opposed to their matched firms. 
 
6.4 Prediction of Distress: Bankruptcy, Mergers & Acquisitions and Deletions 
In table 16, panel A, columns 1 and 2 for all years, we find that current ratio for the logit model 
is significantly and negatively related to the dependant variable, which in this case is the 
Bankruptcy Binary variable with a chi-squared of -0.91, significant at 0.001. This demonstrates 
that the firms that have the ability to pay short term and long term obligations are not likely to go 
bankrupt in the future. Also, we notice that the ratio of operating income to assets is negatively 
related to the bankruptcy dependent binary variable, with a significance of 0.10. This shows that 
the firms that have higher profitability ratio (op. income/assets) are less likely to go bankrupt. 
We would expect that the variable retained earnings/assets would also be negatively related to 
the bankruptcy binary variable, as it also measures profitability. We find that the two are 
positively related, significant at 0.01. In contrast, for the sample -1 to +1, there are no variables 
that are significantly explain the bankruptcy variable. 
For the significance of the model for all years as a whole shown in table 16, panel B, the 
likelihood ratio chi-square of 62.6137 with a p-value of 0.0001 leads us to conclude that the 
model as a whole fits significantly and that that it is statistically significant. 
In table 17, panel A, we find that  for the sample for all years, the debt ratio is positively related 
to the Mergers and Acquisitions binary dependant variable with a chi-squared of 6.5207 
significant at 0.05 for the logit model and a chi-squared of 6.75 significant at 0.01 for the probit 
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model. This could be explained with the fact that a higher debt ratio could lead to a higher 
probability for bankruptcy. On the other hand, we see a negative relationship between sales and 
M&A probability, significant at 0.0001. This demonstrates that higher sale leads to lower 
probability of mergers or acquisitions. In addition, we see a negative relationship between the 
auditor dummy and probability of M&A with a chi-squared of 34.4, significant at 0.0001 for the 
logit model and 41.02 with a significant p-value of 0.0001 for the probit. This significant and 
negative relationship allows us to conclude that firms that do change their auditing firm quickly ( 
in the first 6 months) tend to have a lower probability of distress, and a lower probability of 
merging or being acquired by another firm. 
As for the sample for trigger year and year +1, we find a significant and negative relationship 
between the retained earnings to assets variable and M&A probability. This is as expected, since 
a high profitability ratio would lead a lower risk of distress for a company. 
For the significance of the model for the years ranging from the trigger year to year +3, shown in 
panel Table 17, panel B, the likelihood ratio chi-square of 163.3480 with a p-value of 0.0001 
leads us to conclude that the model as a whole fits significantly and that that it is statistically 
significant. 
Finally, in table 18, panel A, we study the explanatory variables and their effect on the 
probability of firm to be dropped from an exchange.  We find that there is significant and 
negative relationship between sales and the probability of a firm’s deletion form an exchange, for 
the sample ranging from year 0 to year 3, shown  with a chi-squared of 41.01, significant at 
0.0001 for the logit model and a chi-squared of 41.3 significant again at 0.0001. Similarly, we 
find that there is significant and negative relationship between sales and the probability of a firm 
being dropped form an exchange for the sample from -1 to +1, shown with a chi-squared of 
6.2817, significant at 0.05 for the logit model and a chi-squared of 6.6716 significant again at 
0.05. 
For the significance of the model for all years as a whole shown in table 18, panel B, the 
likelihood ratio chi-square of 73.33 with a p-value of 0.0001 leads us to conclude that the model 
as a whole fits significantly and that that it is statistically significant. In addition, for the model 
for the period (-1+1) years, we find a likelihood ratio 15.35 for the logit regression and 15.60 for 
the probit regression, with significant p-values of 0.052 and 0.048, respectively. 
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We conclude and partially agree with hypothesis 7 that changing the auditing firm, an increase in 
sales and a high ratio of retained earnings to assets predict a lower probability of financial 
distress, as opposed to a high debt ratio, that predicts a high risk of financial distress. 
 
6.5              Evolution of 3-Year CAARs. 
Accounting information from financial statements can describe the financial condition of a 
company. These reports may also provide information that could be used to forecast the evolution 
of the mean cumulative abnormal returns of a firm. In this section, we discuss our findings and 
investigate whether some accounting ratios or other explanatory variables may be significantly 
related to the trend in the CAARs of our sample firms. In table 19, panel A, we find that there is a 
significant and positive relationship between earnings before interest and taxes to assets (ROTA) 
ratio and the dependant 3-year CAAR variable. This is as expected, since it demonstrates how the 
firms in our sample that effectively use their assets to generate higher earnings before obligatory 
payments made tend to have higher cumulative average abnormal returns. Similarly, table 19 
demonstrates how firms that do change their CFO In the first 6 months tend to enjoy higher mean 
cumulative abnormal returns in the next 3 years.  In contrast, firms with high accruals tend to have 
low 3-year CAAR values. This can be explained by the negative relationship between the non-
discretionary and discretionary Jones model variables, with t-stats of -1.84 and -1.77 respectively, 
both significant at 10%.  
We conclude and partially support our 9
th
 hypothesis as we find that an increase in ROTA and a 
quick change in the CFO results in a higher mean cumulative abnormal returns, as opposed to the 
relationship between accruals and CAARs, where high accruals results in lower mean cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
There are many ways for a company to re-create itself, be it replacing the CEO or CFO, or its 
auditing firm. But our research suggests that it is also all about the timing. Our findings show 
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that after the trigger event where the SEC is aware of a potential problem with a firm, the market, 
once also aware, reacts significantly and negatively. We compare our sample that had a trigger 
event with another matched sample that did not and find that the two samples are significantly 
different. This gives the firm an incentive for the firms that have received scrutiny from the SEC 
to make changes both inside and outside the company, be it in the top management, the name of 
the firm, or changing its auditing firm. Through our results and previous literature, we find that 
that a change in CEO or CFO causes a negative and significant short-term reaction by the 
market, which was discussed by Karpoff et Al (2008), while these negative abnormal returns 
return to their positive trend only for the firms that have made the change quickly after the 
trigger event, one of the contributions of our study. We see that the only subsample of firms that 
end-up having a positive trend in their CARs is the subsample that made the change in CEO and 
CFO after up to 3 months from the trigger date. This suggests that a timely change is needed for 
recuperation in stock returns. 
We also study the spread evolution around the trigger announcement and find that high-low 
spread values are higher for the fraud sample compared to the matched sample starting days 
before the announcement of the trigger event. This suggests that the trigger event has increased 
the information asymmetry in the market, and that informed traders start trading even before the 
trigger event, explained by the significant and positive spread values before event day 0. We also 
test that the two matched samples have significantly different means. Our findings also show that 
an announcement in change in CEO CFO or Auditing firm causes information asymmetry, with 
the market wondering whether it was the right decision to change the top management. Just as 
literature suggests that there are conflicting interpretations to changing a CEO, it may also be the 
case for the investors. Also, we find that the Nondiscretionary Jones and Modified Jones models 
show a significant difference between the two samples, and therefore conclude that these models 
are able to detect the firms involved in fraudulent earnings as opposed to their matched firms. 
Finally, we find that a change the auditing firm, an increase in sales and a high ratio of retained 
earnings to assets predict a lower probability of financial distress, and, in contrast, a high debt 
ratio, that predicts a high risk of financial distress. On the other hand, firms that use their 
earnings portion of the assets more effectively and change their CFO quickly after the fraud 
announcement tend to have higher mean cumulative abnormal returns, as opposed to the 
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relationship between accruals and CAARs, where high accruals results in lower mean cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
Our research focuses on the aftermath of the fraud trigger event, how the market reacts 
subsequently and how the firm reacts to the market reaction. It would be interesting to also 
investigate the specific type of fraud and its effect on the market. Also, it would be thought-
provoking to also investigate at the probability to change the management after the trigger event, 
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9. APPENDICES  
FIGURES 
Figure 1: Evolution in Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns around Trigger event for the original fraud 
sample. This figure shows Market Adjusted Cumulative Average Abnormal returns for the original fraud simple 
around different events. The figure shows for the window (-30,+30). The trigger event, day 0, is where the fraud 
firms separate from the matched firms. Panel A shows the evolution of the cumulative average abnormal returns 
around the trigger event (Day 0). Panel B shows the evolution of cumulative average abnormal returns around the 
Announcement of change in auditing firm. Panel C shows the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of change in company name. Panel D shows the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns around the 





Figure 2. Evolution in Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns aroud announcement of change in CEO. 
This figure shows Market Adjusted Cumulative Average Abnormal returns for the original fraud simple around 
the announcement of change in CEO.. The 4 Figures show the evolution of the mean cumulative abnormal returns 
after the announcement of the change in CEO (Month 0) in Panel A after the Announcement of the CFO (Month 




Panel A: Evolution of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement of change in CEO 
 
 
Panel B: Evolution of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement of change in CFO 
 
 
Panel C: A comparison in the evolution of Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement 
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Figure 3: Evolution in Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns around Trigger event for the fraud and 
matched samples. This figure shows Market Adjusted Cumulative Average Abnormal returns for the original fraud 
simple around the trigger event. The figure shows for the window (-30,+30). The trigger event, day 0, is where the 
fraud firms seperate from the matched firms. The fraud firms face scrutiny from the SEC, thus are exposed to a 





Figure 4: A comparison in the evolution of the mean cumulative abnormal return for firms that have made 3 
changes, 2 change or upto 1 change from the following: CEO, CFO and auditor. This figure shows a 
comparison of Market Adjusted Cumulative Average Abnormal returns for the original fraud simple around the 
trigger event, taking into account the number of management changes. The figure shows for the window (-30,+365). 
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Table 1: Industry Table.  
This Table Contains the original sample of firms and information regarding their industry and a 2-digit SIC Code. 
The Frequency and Frequency Percentage (%) of each industry is also shown in the table. 
Industry Name SIC Frequency (%) 
Oil and Gas Extraction 13 8 3.81% 
Building Construction General Contractors 15 1 0.48% 
Construction Special Trade Contractors 17 1 0.48% 
Food and Kindred Products 20 6 2.86% 
Apparel and Other Finished Products made from fabrics and similar materials 23 3 1.43% 
Paper and Allied Products 26 2 0.95% 
Printing Publishing and Allied Industries 27 3 1.43% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 10 4.76% 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 30 1 0.48% 
Primary Metal Industries 33 1 0.48% 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 4 1.90% 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 22 10.48% 
Electronic & other Electrical Equipment & Components, excep. Computer 
Equipment 
36 20 9.52% 
Transportation Equipment 37 6 2.86% 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments 38 9 4.29% 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 42 1 0.48% 
Water Transportation 44 1 0.48% 
Transportation by Air 45 1 0.48% 
Communications 48 5 2.38% 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 49 8 3.81% 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 50 4 1.90% 
Wholesale Trade-Non Durable Goods 51 8 3.81% 
General Merchandise Stores 53 2 0.95% 
Food Stores 54 3 1.43% 
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 55 1 0.48% 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 1 0.48% 
Eating and Drinking Places 58 3 1.43% 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 3 1.43% 
Depository Institutions 60 10 4.76% 
Non-Depository Credit Institutions 61 4 1.90% 
Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services 62 3 1.43% 
Insurance Carriers 63 5 2.38% 
Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 64 1 0.48% 
Holdings and Other Investment Offices 67 4 1.90% 
Personal Services 72 2 0.95% 
Business Services 73 30 14.29% 
Amusement and Recreation Services 79 4 1.90% 
Health Servies 80 6 2.86% 
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Educational Services 82 1 0.48% 
Social Services 83 1 0.48% 






Table 2: Summary Statistics.  
Table reports the summary statistics for the studied variables, both independent and dependant. The summary statistics are 
calculated for both the fraud sample and the matched sample. We look at the difference in means, including the sign of the 
difference and its significance (p-value). (Mean Difference = Fraud sample - Matched sample). 
  FRAUD SAMPLE MATCHED SAPMLE Mean 
Difference 
P 
value Variable Mean Std Dev N Median Mean Std Dev N Median 
Total Assets 33264.881 135920.04 214 1397.91 33608.913 134853.83 214 1497.74 -344.032 0.979 
C. Shares 
Outstanding 
240.960 881.662 191 45.435 233.694 663.623 192 45.978 7.266 0.927 
EBIT 522.698 2568.420 192 63.175 776.135 3831.083 189 60.411 -253.437 0.448 
Total Liabilities 28829.427 125683.41 214 726.859 29837.748 127338.30 214 817.876 -1008.321 0.934 
Retained Earnings 2147.185 9783.472 214 108.412 1749.651 6375.143 214 72.096 397.534 0.619 
Stockholde’s 
Equity 
4185.611 15017.502 214 530.512 3551.787 9729.779 214 391.825 633.824 0.605 
Deferred Taxes 284.429 1403.394 196 0.454 413.496 2289.597 171 0.277 -129.067 0.510 
Working Capital 388.858 1264.589 214 73.945 254.824 1687.840 214 1.872 134.034 0.353 
Close price 28.881 24.917 214 21.633 28.270 26.110 212 24.125 0.610 0.805 
Book Equity 4370.755 16059.753 214 549.793 3782.385 10474.130 214 401.393 588.370 0.654 
Market Equity 9228.451 36746.805 191 971.915 9424.311 37030.174 192 781.352 -195.860 0.959 
Market-to-Book 4.435 11.348 191 2.327 4.435 11.662 192 2.281 0.000 1.000 
Altman_Z 5.821 14.426 191 3.079 4.998 9.574 189 2.235 0.823 0.513 
Current Assets 1989.231 4706.998 146 491.486 1406.427 4403.510 109 145.798 582.804 0.316 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 
304.762 1010.538 154 50.237 183.202 609.142 107 16.213 121.560 0.267 
Current Liabilities 1470.851 3858.248 148 239.716 1434.331 4117.744 81 147.738 36.520 0.947 
Property, plant 
and equipment 
1619.898 4630.793 152 239.818 1914.661 6178.362 108 89.347 -294.762 0.661 
Total Receivables 2329.139 18193.463 154 164.282 669.183 1859.100 92 138.733 1659.956 0.384 









Table 3: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted Returns 
for full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original fraud 
sample, for the windows around the trigger event (day 0). Test of significance 














(-30,-2) 207 -0.0752 67:140 -5.805*** -4.698*** 
(-5,-1) 207 -0.0253 81:126 -4.696*** -2.751** 
(-1,+1) 207 -0.1343 47:160 -32.226*** -7.479*** 
(0,+1) 202 -0.136 37:165 -39.968*** -8.636*** 
(0,+7) 202 -0.1546 43:159 -22.719*** -7.791*** 
(+10,+30) 201 -0.0199 92:109 -1.803** -0.827 
(-2,+2) 207 -0.1555 51:156 -28.896*** -6.923*** 
(+1,+5) 200 -0.0193 93:107 -3.584*** -0.619 
(+5,+10) 201 -0.0012 94:107 -0.202 -0.545 
(+1,+15) 201 -0.0034 93:108 -0.368 -0.686 
      
The symbols,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively, 






Table 4: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted 
Returns for full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original 
fraud sample, for the windows around the announcement of change in 
CEO (month 0). Test of significance include Positive:Negative test, 









Generalized Sign Z 
(-6,-2) 123 -12.00% 51:72 -1.692** 
(-1,0) 118 -6.13% 47:71 -2.012** 
(0,0) 116 -4.51% 48:68 -1.661** 
(0,+1) 116 -3.79% 57:59 0.01 
(0,+6) 117 -7.49% 53:64 -0.82 
(+6,+12) 108 5.65% 61:47 1.536* 
(+12,+18) 103 5.83% 53:50 0.48 
(+18,+24) 103 5.41% 54:49 0.677 
The symbols ,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 








Table 5: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted 
Returns for full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original fraud 
sample, for the windows around the announcement of change in CFO (month 
0). Test of significance include Positive:Negative test, Generalized Sign Z 














(-6,-2) 128 -15.43% 42:86 -4.174*** -3.793*** 
(-1,0) 122 -6.80% 50:72 -2.908*** -1.898** 
(0,0) 121 -2.46% 56:65 -1.488* -0.724 
(0,+1) 121 0.15% 63:58 0.064 0.548 
(0,+6) 121 1.99% 52:69 0.454 -1.452* 
(+6,+12) 113 -2.90% 51:62 -0.664 -0.944 
(+12,+18) 106 4.32% 58:48 0.987 1.059 
(+18,+24) 104 9.72% 57:47 2.222** 1.068 
The symbols ,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 






Table 6: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted Returns 
for full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original fraud 
sample, for the windows around the announcement of change in auditing firm (day 
0). Test of significance include Positive:Negative test, Generalized Sign Z and 















(-30,-2) 110 -4.61% 46:64 -2.463*** -1.292* 
(-5,-1) 108 -0.38% 44:64 -0.492 -1.504* 
(-1,+1) 107 1.42% 58:49 2.353*** 1.291* 
(0,+1) 107 0.85% 57:50 1.722* 1.097 
(0,+7) 107 4.02% 61:46 4.084*** 1.871** 
(+10,+30) 106 -5.26% 51:55 -3.298*** 0.029 
(-2,+2) 107 1.37% 57:50 1.764** 1.097 
(+1,+5) 107 -0.57% 54:53 -0.738 0.517 
(+5,+10) 106 2.39% 52:54 2.801*** 0.224 
(+1,+15) 107 -0.69% 51:56 -0.512 -0.064 
      
The symbols ,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively, 






Table 7: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted 
Returns for full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original 
fraud sample, for the windows around the announcement of name change 
(day 0). Test of significance include Positive:Negative test, Generalized 















(-30,-2) 55 3.47% 31:24 1.044 1.189 
(-5,-1) 55 0.14% 27:28 0.098 0.11 
(-1,+1) 55 0.59% 27:28 0.551 0.11 
(0,+1) 55 0.77% 30:25 0.882 0.919 
(0,+7) 55 0.13% 22:33 0.075 -1.239 
(+10,+30) 53 5.80% 29:24 2.051** 0.927 
(-2,+2) 55 1.42% 31:24 1.027 1.189 
(+1,+5) 53 1.30% 22:31 0.946 -0.997 
(+5,+10) 53 -1.38%     17:36    -0.912    -2.371*** 
(+1,+15) 53 1.95% 26:27 0.818 0.103 
      
The symbols ,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, 






Table 8: Market Model, Value Weighted Index:  Market Adjusted Returns for 
full original fraud sample. 
Table shows the Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the original fraud sample, 
for the windows around the class action announcement (day 0). Test of significance 













(-30,-2) 107 -12.92% 26:81 -6.730*** -5.047*** 
(-5,-1) 106 -8.43% 41:65 -10.577*** -2.062** 
(-1,+1) 106 -5.75% 43:63 -9.322*** -1.673** 
(0,+1) 106 -2.45% 44:62 -4.860*** -1.479* 
(0,+7) 106 -4.10% 47:59 -4.068*** -0.896 
(+10,+30) 106 0.92% 61:45 0.561 1.825** 
(-2,+2) 106 -8.90% 35:71 -11.167*** -3.228*** 
(+1,+5) 106 -2.08% 46:60 -2.607*** -1.09 
(+5,+10) 106 0.47% 53:53 0.544 0.27 
(+1,+15) 106 -0.71% 62:44 -0.512 2.019** 
      The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively, using 







Table 9: Information Asymmetry. Table shows Mean cumulative abnormal spread around the announcement of CEO (1) 
and CFO(2) change. T-stat is available to test significance of sample around the announcement of the CEO (1) and the CFO 
(1). Estimation period used is (-290,-45)  



















(-1,+1) 125 0.00213 0.0217 8.59*** <.0001 128 0.00322 0.0298 9.75*** <.0001 
(-1,0) 125 0.00239 0.0216 7.05*** <.0001 128 0.00322 0.0263 7.94*** <.0001 
(0,+1) 125 0.0019 0.0219 5.31*** <.0001 128 0.00328 0.0329 6.33*** <.0001 
(0,+2) 122 0.00237 0.0246 8.24*** <.0001 127 0.00297 0.0309 8.51*** <.0001 
(+1,+3) 122 0.00317 0.0331 8.09*** <.0001 127 0.00269 0.0344 6.87*** <.0001 
(+3,+6) 121 0.00297 0.0253 12.11*** <.0001 125 0.00258 0.0327 8.48*** <.0001 








Table 10: Information Asymmetry. Tables shows Mean Cumulative abnormal spread: Comparison between fraud (1) and matched (2) samples.  
Estimation period used is (-290,-45). T-stat for columns (1) and (2) test the significance of the fraud and matched samples, respectively, relative to the 




























(-30,-2) 140 0.00123 0.0264 3.81*** 0.0001 80 0.000025 0.0268 0.06 0.9555 0.001205  2.183**  0.0292 
(-5,-1) 142 0.00317 0.0424 2.52** 0.0117 77 0.000131 0.0218 0.15 0.8829 0.003039 1.977***  0.0482 
(-1,+1) 142 0.00385 0.0404 2.42** 0.016 75 -0.00031 0.02 -0.28 0.7784 0.00416 1.7578*   0.0791 
(0,+1) 142 0.00278 0.0316 1.81* 0.0717 75 -0.00046 0.0213 -0.32 0.7514 0.00324  1.3758  0.1694 
(0,+7) 140 0.004 0.03 5.49*** <.0001 74 -0.00064 0.0205 -0.92 0.3553 0.00464 4.1119*** <0.0001 
(+10,+30) 137 0.00298 0.0239 8.36*** <.0001 74 -0.00204 0.0176 -5.57 <.0001 0.00502 8.5595*** <0.0001 
(-2,+2) 142 0.00467 0.0412 3.73** 0.0002 75 0.000027 0.0207 0.03 0.9751 0.004643 2.512** 0.0121 
(+1,+5) 141 0.00618 0.0311 6.48*** <.0001 75 -0.0001 0.0221 -0.11 0.9146 0.00628 4.2169*** <0.0001 
(+5,+10) 140 0.00335 0.0272 4.42*** <.0001 76 -0.00217 0.0168 -3.32 0.001 0.00552  4.7669*** <0.0001 
(+1,+15) 139 0.00375 0.0268 7.93*** <.0001 72 -0.00145 0.0187 -3.13 0.0018 0.0052 7.0473*** <0.0001 




Table 11: Accrual Models 
This table shows results for the the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) Model, the Total Current Accruals Jones and Modified Jones Models, the Non-
Discretionary Current Accruals – Jones and Modified Jones Models, The Discretionary Current Accrual-Jones and Modified Jones Models for year -2. Year 0 is 
the year of the occurrence of the trigger event. For each of the models, the results are shown for both the faud sample in column (1) and the Matched sample, 
shown in column (2). The Mean Difference is calculated by Mean (2)- Mean (1) 
In order to test whether the two samples are significantly different, a Difference in means is included.  




Accrual Models N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Total Current 
Accruals - Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1995) 
144 -0.023 0.219 -1.579 -0.033 1.141 72 0.003 0.352 -0.267 -0.034 2.821 0.026  0.5053 
Total Current 
Accruals - Jones 
(1991)  
144 -0.023 0.219 -1.579 -0.033 1.141 72 0.003 0.352 -0.267 -0.034 2.821 0.026  0.5053 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  
150 -0.046 0.1 -0.429 -0.045 0.492 77 -0.027 0.071 -0.142 -0.028 0.48 0.019 0.1388 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Jones 
(1991)  
144 0.021 0.19 -1.319 0.029 0.648 71 -0.009 0.078 -0.221 -0.007 0.175 -0.03 0.1855 
Total Current 
Accruals - Modified 
Jones (1991)  
144 -0.023 0.219 -1.579 -0.033 1.141 72 0.003 0.352 -0.267 -0.034 2.821 0.026  0.5053 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones 
(1991)  
150 -0.046 0.1 -0.465 -0.045 0.494 76 -0.035 0.077 -0.315 -0.032 0.449 0.011 0.3624 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Modified 
Jones (1991) 
144 0.021 0.19 -1.258 0.03 0.685 70 -0.008 0.078 -0.23 -0.002 0.15 -0.029 0.1156 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 51 
 
Table 12: Accrual Models. This table shows results for the the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) Model, the Total Current Accruals Jones and Modified 
Jones Models, the Non-Discretionary Current Accruals – Jones and Modified Jones Models, The Discretionary Current Accrual-Jones and Modified Jones 
Models for year -1. Year 0 is the year of the occurrence of the trigger event. For each of the models, the results are shown for both the faud sample in column 
(1) and the Matched sample, shown in column (2). The Mean Difference is calculated by Mean (2)- Mean (1) 
In order to test whether the two samples are significantly different, a Difference in means is included.  




value Accrual Models N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Total Current 
Accruals - Dechow, 
Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) 
145 -0.046 0.247 -2.128 -0.04 0.923 72 -0.042 0.079 -0.303 -0.038 0.127 0.004 0.893 
Total Current 
Accruals - Jones 
(1991)  
145 -0.046 0.247 -2.128 -0.04 0.923 72 -0.042 0.079 -0.303 -0.038 0.127 0.004 0.893 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  
151 -0.02 0.075 -0.189 -0.024 0.439 78 -0.008 0.029 -0.188 -0.004 0.064 0.012 0.192 
Discretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  





145 -0.046 0.247 -2.128 -0.04 0.923 72 -0.042 0.079 -0.303 -0.038 0.127 0.004 0.893 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones 
(1991)  
151 -0.02 0.07 -0.201 -0.022 0.452 77 -0.009 0.027 -0.18 -0.005 0.057 0.011 0.0876 
Discretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones 
(1991) 
145 -0.028 0.237 -2.109 -0.01 0.866 70 -0.034 0.079 -0.246 -0.034 0.209 -0.006 0.8291 





Table 13: Accrual Models. This table shows results for the the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) Model, the Total Current Accruals Jones and Modified 
Jones Models, the Non-Discretionary Current Accruals – Jones and Modified Jones Models, The Discretionary Current Accrual-Jones and Modified Jones 
Models for year 0, which is the year of the occurrence of the trigger event. For each of the models, the results are shown for both the faud sample in column 
(1) and the Matched sample, shown in column (2). The Mean Difference is calculated by Mean (2)- Mean (1) 
In order to test whether the two samples are significantly different, a Difference in means is included.  
 
  Fraud Sample Matched Sample Mean 
Difference 
p-value 
Accrual Models N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max N Mean 
Std 
Dev 






140 -0.049 0.174 -0.336 -0.052 1.766 75 -0.062 0.091 -0.455 -0.051 0.083 -0.013 0.5466 
Total Current 
Accruals - Jones 
(1991)  
140 -0.049 0.174 -0.336 -0.052 1.766 75 -0.062 0.091 -0.455 -0.051 0.083 -0.013 0.5466 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  
145 -0.029 0.119 -0.394 -0.026 0.944 79 -0.051 0.056 -0.261 -0.04 0.051 -0.022** 0.0674 
Discretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  





140 -0.049 0.174 -0.336 -0.052 1.766 75 -0.062 0.091 -0.455 -0.051 0.083 -0.013 0.5466 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones 
(1991)  
145 -0.029 0.099 -0.386 -0.021 0.632 78 -0.052 0.053 -0.272 -0.041 0.012 -0.023** 0.0576 
Discretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones 
(1991) 
140 -0.021 0.146 -0.335 -0.024 1.135 74 -0.009 0.081 -0.342 -0.015 0.249 0.012 0.513 





Table 14: Accrual Models. This table shows results for the the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) Model, the Total Current Accruals Jones and Modified 
Jones Models, the Non-Discretionary Current Accruals – Jones and Modified Jones Models, The Discretionary Current Accrual-Jones and Modified Jones 
Models for year +1. Year 0 is the year of the occurrence of the trigger event. For each of the models, the results are shown for both the faud sample in column 
(1) and the Matched sample, shown in column (2). The Mean Difference is calculated by Mean (2)- Mean (1) 
In order to test whether the two samples are significantly different, a Difference in means is included.  




Accrual Models N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Total Current Accruals 
- Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) 
137 -0.054 0.084 -0.418 -0.045 0.296 73 -0.085 0.363 -3.078 -0.043 0.221 -0.031 0.3356 
Total Current Accruals 
- Jones (1991)  
137 -0.054 0.084 -0.418 -0.045 0.296 73 -0.085 0.363 -3.078 -0.043 0.221 -0.031 0.3356 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  
143 -0.041 0.036 -0.198 -0.035 0.054 76 -0.04 0.047 -0.154 -0.035 0.221 0.001  0.8642 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Jones (1991)  
137 -0.014 0.084 -0.379 -0.012 0.318 72 -0.003 0.061 -0.136 -0.007 0.206 0.011 0.3268 
Total Current Accruals 
- Modified Jones 
(1991)  
137 -0.054 0.084 -0.418 -0.045 0.296 73 -0.085 0.363 -3.078 -0.043 0.221 -0.031 0.4744 
Nondiscretionary 
Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones (1991)  
143 -0.041 0.033 -0.194 -0.032 0.031 75 -0.039 0.046 -0.151 -0.032 0.213 0.002 0.8218 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Modified 
Jones (1991) 
137 -0.014 0.085 -0.393 -0.011 0.314 71 -0.003 0.062 -0.138 -0.006 0.208 0.011 0.2878 







Table 15: Accrual Models. This table shows results for the the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) Model, the Total Current Accruals Jones and Modified 
Jones Models, the Non-Discretionary Current Accruals – Jones and Modified Jones Models, The Discretionary Current Accrual-Jones and Modified Jones 
Models for year +2. Year 0 is the year of the occurrence of the trigger event. For each of the models, the results are shown for both the faud sample in column 
(1) and the Matched sample, shown in column (2). The Mean Difference is calculated by Mean (2)- Mean (1) 
In order to test whether the two samples are significantly different, a Difference in means is included.  




Accrual Models N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Median Max 
Total Current Accruals - 
Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995) 
141 -0.039 0.088 -0.317 -0.034 0.411 75 -0.105 0.523 -4.501 -0.037 0.328 -0.066  0.1509 
Total Current Accruals - 
Jones (1991)  
141 -0.039 0.088 -0.317 -0.034 0.411 75 -0.105 0.523 -4.501 -0.037 0.328 -0.066  0.1509 
Nondiscretionary Current 
Accruals - Jones (1991)  
147 -0.033 0.026 -0.17 -0.027 0.006 78 -0.168 0.244 -1.402 -0.105 0.121 -0.135*** 0.0001 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Jones (1991)  
141 -0.006 0.087 -0.281 -0.005 0.475 75 0.066 0.434 -3.099 0.045 1.296 0.072 0.1596 
Total Current Accruals - 
Modified Jones (1991)  
141 -0.039 0.088 -0.317 -0.034 0.411 75 -0.105 0.523 -4.501 -0.037 0.328 -0.066  0.1509 
Nondiscretionary Current 
Accruals - Modified 
Jones (1991)  
147 -0.033 0.026 -0.17 -0.027 0.004 77 -0.183 0.255 -1.536 -0.117 0.11 -0.15*** <0.0001 
Discretionary Current 
Accruals - Modified 
Jones (1991) 
141 -0.006 0.087 -0.281 -0.005 0.476 74 0.083 0.422 -2.965 0.076 1.135 0.089* 0.0736 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 16: Logit and Probit Regressions Results: Bankruptcy binary variable as dependent 
variable. This table presents the coefficient and t-statistics of Logit (1) and Probit (2) regressions 
having as dependent variable the Bankruptcy binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm has 
gone bankrupt, and 0 when it is not the case. Panel A presents a test for the explanatory variables for 
the model which include debt-to-asset ratio, Operating income to total assets, retained earnings to total 
assets, current assets to current liabilities, Logarithm of sales, as well as dummy variables for CEO (1 
when there is change of CEO, 0 otherwise), CFO (1 when there is change of CFO, 0 otherwise) and 
Auditor (1 when there is change of auditor, 0 otherwise). Panel B is represents the significance of the 
whole model and includes the Chi-Squared and p-value for Logit and Probit models, for both All years 
and (-1,1). 
 









Intercept -2.2693*** -1.4793*** 
 
-3.9636 1.7303 
ᵡ2 15.565 24.6001 
 
0.5545 0.7198 
Debt Ratio  1.1982 0.4233 
 
5.5605 2.2953 
ᵡ2 1.8805 0.94 
 
1.9278 1.632 













ᵡ2 4.586 5.08 
 
0.4153 0.37 
Current Ratio -0.9191*** -0.4007*** 
 
-1.5279 -0.6424 
 ᵡ2 22.5913 22.62 
 
1.4574 1.35 
Log of Sales 0.0552 0.0212 
 
0.0408 -0.0141 
ᵡ2 0.5523 0.4306 
 
0.0043 0.037 
CEO dummy 0.4586 -0.1452 
 
1.598 0.501 
ᵡ2 1.8918 0.9062 
 
0.8797 0.46 
CFO dummy -13.357 -3.984 
 
-9.065 -2.80 
ᵡ2 0.0008 0.0002 
 
0.0002 0 
Auditor dummy -12.746 -3.8868 
 
-9.579 -3.15 
ᵡ2 0.0024 0.0007 
 
0.006 0.001 
      
Panel B. A test of significance for the model 
Likelihood Ratio (ᵡ2) 62.6137 62.7937  5.8828 5.3412 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.6604 0.7206 
Score (ᵡ2) 25.0510 25.0510  4.6647 4.6647 
p-value 0.0015 0.0015  0.7927 0.7927 
Wald (ᵡ2) 32.6990 30.5825  4.0827 3.0659 
p-value  <.0001 0.0002  0.8496 0.9302 




Table 17: Logit and Probit Regressions Results: Mergers and Acquisitions binary variable as 
dependent variable. This table presents the coefficient and t-statistics of Logit (1) and Probit (2) 
regressions having as dependent variable the M&A binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the 
firm has merged or has been acquired, and 0 when it is not the case. Panel A presents a test for the 
explanatory variables for the model which include debt-to-asset ratio, Operating income to total assets, 
retained earnings to total assets, current assets to current liabilities, Logarithm of sales, as well as 
dummy variables for CEO (1 when there is change of CEO, 0 otherwise), CFO (1 when there is change 
of CFO, 0 otherwise) and Auditor (1 when there is change of auditor, 0 otherwise). Panel B is 
represents the significance of the whole model and includes the Chi-Squared and p-value for Logit and 
Probit models, for both All years and (-1, 1). 
 









Intercept 0.5668** 0.3434** 
 
0.3715 0.2144 
ᵡ2  9.9192 10.12 
 
0.214 0.19 
Debt Ratio  0.7906*  0.4881** 
 
2.1380 1.3218 
ᵡ2 6.5207 6.75 
 
0.1354 2.44 













ᵡ2 0.3192 0.23 
 
4.2269 4.3009 
Current Ratio -0.0294 -0.0193* 
 
-0.0552 -0.0331 
ᵡ2 2.3748 2.912 
 
0.3699 0.404 
Log of Sales -0.2395*** -0.1461*** 
 
-0.2013* -0.1217** 
ᵡ2 103.1206 110.82 
 
3.7183 3.848 
CEO dummy 0.169 0.1168* 
 
0.0220 0.0305 
ᵡ2 2.2437 2.99 
 
0.0026 0.0137 
CFO dummy 0.554** 0.3379*** 
 
0.7146 0.4214 
ᵡ2 5.2242 5.28 
 
0.5586 0.512 
Auditor dummy -1.4474*** -0.8318*** 
 
-1.3863 -0.8277 
ᵡ2 34.8416 41.0252 
 
1.6115 2.03 
      
Panel B. A test of significance for the model 
Likelihood Ratio (ᵡ2) 163.3480 168.6884 
 
18.9574 18.9956 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.0151 0.0149 
Score (ᵡ2) 154.4132 154.4132 
 
18.8593 18.8593 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.0156 0.0156 
Wald (ᵡ2) 143.0154 157.3468 
 
14.3779 15.9215 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.0724 0.0435 









Table 18: Logit and Probit Regressions Results: Dropped binary variable as dependent variable. 
This table presents the coefficient and t-statistics of Logit (1) and Probit (2) regressions having as 
dependent variable the Delist binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm has been dropped, 
and 0 when it is not the case. Panel A presents a test for the explanatory variables for the model which 
include debt-to-asset ratio, Operating income to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, current 
assets to current liabilities, Logarithm of sales, as well as dummy variables for CEO (1 when there is 
change of CEO, 0 otherwise), CFO (1 when there is change of CFO, 0 otherwise) and Auditor (1 when 
there is change of auditor, 0 otherwise). Panel B is represents the significance of the whole model and 
includes the Chi-Squared and p-value for Logit and Probit models, for both All years and (-1, 1). 
 









Intercept -1.2666*** -0.8086*** 
 
0.6827 0.4146 
ᵡ2 16.2191 26.1816 
 
0.7524 0.7570 
Debt Ratio  0.2660 0.0963 
 
2.9976* 1.8399* 
ᵡ2 0.1793 0.0987 
 
3.5151 3.8359 













ᵡ2 1.2517 1.7955 
 
0.5706 0.5098 
Current Ratio 0.0311 0.0116 
 
0.0295 0.0182 
ᵡ2 1.5493 0.7304 
 
0.1583 0.1571 
Log of Sales -0.2945*** -0.1421*** 
 
-0.2628** -0.1607** 
ᵡ2 41.0168 41.3043 
 
6.2817 6.6716 
CEO dummy 0.0920 0.0240 
 
0.0357 0.0332 
ᵡ2 0.1665 0.0499 
 
0.0071 0.0169 
CFO dummy  -13.7244 -3.8398 
 
0.6214 0.3661 
ᵡ2 0.0007 0.0499 
 
0.408 0.3778 
Auditor dummy -0.7383 -0.2519 
 
-0.8556 -0.5332 
ᵡ2 3.3204 1.9932 
 
0.9429 1.1149 
      
Panel B. A test of significance for the model 
Likelihood Ratio (ᵡ2) 73.3305 74.8541 
 
15.3532 15.6026 
p-value  <.0001 <.0001  0.0526 0.0484 
Score(ᵡ2) 78.9360 78.9360 
 
15.1056 15.1056 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.0571 0.0571 
Wald (ᵡ2) 65.0234 64.4684 
 
13.0628 14.3375 
p-value <.0001 <.0001  0.1097 0.0734 






Table 19: OLS Regressions Results: 3-year CAARs as dependent variable. This 
table presents the coefficient and t-statistics for OLS regression having as 
dependent variable 3-year CAARs. Using two-dimension cluster standard errors, 
taking into account correlations amongst different firms in the same year, and 
different years for the same firm. Panel A presents a test for the explanatory 
variables for the model which include debt-to-asset ratio, Earnings before Interest 
and Taxes to Assets(ROTA), retained earnings to total assets, current assets to 
current liabilities, Total Accruals Model, Discretionary Jones Model, Discretionary 
modified Jones Model, Non-discretionary Jones model Logarithm of sales, as well 
as dummy variables for CEO (1 when there is change of CEO, 0 otherwise), CFO (1 
when there is change of CFO, 0 otherwise) and Auditor (1 when there is change of 
auditor, 0 otherwise). Panel B 
 
Panel A. A test of significance for the explanatory variables in the model 
Intercept 11.48 * 
t-stat 1.78 
Debt Ratio  1.201 
t-stat 1.40 
Retained Earnings/Assets   -0.133 
t-stat -1.54 
Current Ratio .0126 
t-stat 0.42   
ROTA 1.513*** 
t-stat 2.91 
Log of Sales 0.0053 
t-stat 0.07 
Total Accruals Model 6.298 
t-stat 1.49 
Discretionary Jones Model -7.062 * 
t-stat -1.84 
Discretionary Modified Jones Model -1.1420 
t-stat   -0.50 
Non-Discretionary Model -9.794 * 
t-stat  -1.77 
CEO dummy -0.0398 
t-stat -0.12 
CFO dummy  0.8663 *  
t-stat 1.81 
Auditor dummy 0.0413 
t-stat 0.20 
  
Panel B. A test of significance for the model 
N  165 
1.54 F-statistic 
Prob > F 0.11 
R-squared 0.099 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
levels, respectively 
 
